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Abstract  
Today’s “theory of mind” (ToM) concept is rooted in the distinction of nineteenth century 
philosopher William Clifford between “objects” that can be directly perceived, and “ejects,” 
such as the mind of another person, which are inferred from one’s subjective knowledge of 
one’s own mind. A founder, with Charles Darwin, of the discipline of comparative psychology, 
George Romanes considered the minds of animals as ejects, an idea that could be generalized 
to “society as eject” and, ultimately, “the world as an eject” – mind in the universe. Yet, 
Romanes and Clifford only vaguely connected mind with the abstraction we call “information,” 
which needs “a vehicle of symbols” – a material transporting medium. However, Samuel Butler 
was able to address, in informational terms depleted of theological trappings, both organic 
evolution and mind in the universe. This view harmonizes with insights arising from modern 
DNA research, the relative immortality of “selfish” genes, and some startling recent 
developments in brain research. 
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Introduction 
Charles Darwin’s work impacted three major areas – evolution in general, 
neuroscience/psychology, and philosophy/theology. The demands of the first occupying much 
of his time, it was a relief to pass the burden to someone who shared his enthusiasm, like 
himself was independently wealthy and, most importantly, was four decades younger. Two 
quotations capture this: ‘How glad I am you are so young’ marked Darwin’s first meeting with 
George John Romanes in 1874 (Forsdyke, 2001: 204). And when the German evolutionist Ernst 
Haeckel dismissed part of Darwin’s work as an ‘airy nothing,’ Darwin in 1876 quipped that 
Romanes would ‘some day, I hope, convert an “airy nothing” into a substantial theory’ 
(Schwartz, 2010: 138). Furthermore, the young man, having trained in neurophysiology at 
Cambridge, and having a deep interest in both psychology and philosophy/theology, was well 
prepared to address the latter two areas of Darwin’s work.  
Thus, apart from his immediate family, during the last eight years of Darwin’s life (1809-
1882) it is likely that no one had more opportunity to discuss evolution with him than Romanes 
(1848-1894). Indeed, with permission, his mentor’s unpublished manuscripts on brain evolution 
were incorporated by Romanes into a major work – Mental Evolution in Animals (Romanes, 
1884; Stauffer, 1975: 463-527). In 1886 The Times of London hailed Romanes as ‘the biological 
investigator upon whom the mantle of Darwin has most conspicuously descended’ (Forsdyke, 
2001: 220-222).  
But their warm relationship was shattered at Darwin’s death. To cope with his grief, and to 
feel a way towards deeper theological issues that resisted clear articulation, Romanes turned to 
poetry – a passion that, together with his philosophical/theological writings, he had either kept 
from the public, or had contributed anonymously (Romanes, 1889; Turner, 1974; Pleins, 2014). 
To his friends, he was ‘the philosopher,’ and he sometimes signed his letters as such. His friends 
included the philosopher William Clifford.  
In his 1885 Cambridge Rede Lecture, Romanes addressed from a neurobiological perspective 
the perceived confrontation between evolution and theology engendered by Darwin’s work – a 
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confrontation that endures. But, while the lecture and associated essays (Romanes, 1882, 1885, 
1886) opened up new territory, there was something missing. Assisted by advances in DNA 
research, we can today recognize that he – like most, but not all, of his Victorian 
contemporaries – did not see that the issues might become clearer if addressed in 
informational terms. The Victorian exception was Samuel Butler who, with Prague 
neurophysiologist Ewald Hering, introduced information concepts to biology in the 1870s that 
would provide foundations for an understanding of both brains (mental memory) and genomes 
(genetic memory).   
This paper is in four parts. The first covers Clifford’s idea of ejective inference and Romanes’ 
theoretical exploration of its scope. The second deals with Hering-Butler information concepts. 
The third, extending the seminal studies of Schacter (2001) and Otis (1994), covers the 
controversy surrounding Butler’s work. Finally, this history is related to some modern 
perspectives on science and theology.   
1. Ejective inference 
Theory of mind as ejective inference 
There is much current interest in ‘theory of mind,’ (ToM; Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Frith, 
2012), a topic dating back to Romanes (Obiols and Berrios, 2009), who built on earlier work of 
Clifford. Your knowledge of mind begins with your subjective understanding of your own 
thought processes. To this you attach the word ‘mind.’ This is the seemingly inescapable frame 
of reference through which you view both the world and the minds of others (Tononi and Koch, 
2014). But the way you view the world differs from the way you view other minds. Since I share 
numerous attributes with you (e.g. we belong to the same species) it would seem reasonable to 
suppose that my thought processes operate in the same way as yours. So you can imagine 
yourself ‘in my shoes.’ Based on this ToM, you can make predictions about my behaviour that 
will generally be correct (e.g. you would help an old lady across the road, and so would I). But 
there remains uncertainty. For example, many in Western societies find it difficult to conceive 
mindsets that lead to self-immolation for what are deemed ‘terrorist’ causes. Thus, my mind – 
not directly accessible to you – is an inferred entity. As such it is, in the word of Clifford, an 
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‘eject’ – not an ‘object’ that can be observed by your senses, even if assisted by technology (e.g. 
the microscope and perhaps even modern brain-scanning devices; but see Carrington and 
Bailey, 2009). Thus a ToM, relating to ‘a subjective order in many respects analogous to my 
own,’ can be referred to as an ejective hypothesis (Clifford, 1878: 275). So there are three 
‘ivities:’ subjectivity, ejectivity and objectivity, of which the first is one’s own, introspective, 
personal frame of reference. 
Mind as emergent property 
Clifford, a Professor of Applied Mathematics at University College, London, thought that, 
despite being perceivable by others only ejectively, your mind (your subjectivity), like their 
minds (their subjectivities), would obey the laws of physics and chemistry that applied to the 
objective world. Such laws dealt with the two fundamental entities - matter and motion, the 
latter often displaced today by the term ‘energy.’  These two – matter, and the motion of that 
matter – composed what he called ‘mind-stuff,’ something with the potential to become 
constituted into a form with the property we call ‘mind’ (i.e. stuff that, at some level of 
complexity, could form mind). Thus, ‘a moving molecule of inorganic matter does not possess 
mind or consciousness; but it possesses a small piece of mind-stuff’ (Clifford, 1878: 284). 
Assuming mind as part of your body, then ‘the facts do very strongly lead us to regard our 
bodies as merely complicated examples of practically universal physical rules, and their motions 
as determined in the same way as those of the sun and the sea’ (Clifford, 1878: 279). So, ‘when 
matter takes on the complex form of a living human brain, the corresponding mind-stuff takes 
the form of a human consciousness, having intelligence and volition’ (Clifford, 1878: 284). Mind, 
circumscribed within an organism, was a property that could emerge when its mind-stuff had 
attained a sufficient level of complexity. Thus: ‘Reason, intelligence, and volition are properties 
of a complex which is made up of elements themselves not rational, not intelligent, not 
conscious’ (Clifford, 1878: 286).  
Romanes expanded the scope of ejective inference 
Clifford (1878: 277) held that ‘recognition of a kindred consciousness in one’s fellow-beings – is 
clearly a condition of gregarious action among animals so highly developed as to be called 
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conscious at all.’ Romanes took this further in his three essays (Romanes, 1882, 1885, 1886). 
Could we ejectively infer what an animal was thinking and so predict its behaviour? Conversely, 
could an animal ejectively infer what we think and so predict our behaviour? While 
experimental studies date the emergence of human ejective powers during childhood (Obiols 
and Berrios, 2009; Frith, 2012), the design of such experiments in animals has proved 
problematic (Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Radick, 2007: 70-83). No less problematic are ejective 
predictions concerning what appear to be higher levels of complexity than either animals or 
ourselves.  
Romanes (1882: 885) considered Clifford’s ‘essay … the most closely reasoned and profound 
of all his philosophical writings.’ Like Clifford, he located mind within the brain (Romanes, 1882: 
871): 
‘Within experience, mind is found in constant and definite association with that highly 
complex and peculiar disposition of living matter called a living brain, the size and 
elaboration of which throughout the animal kingdom stands in conspicuous proportion to 
the degree of intelligence displayed, and the impairment of which … entails 
corresponding impairment of mental processes.’ 
 Indeed, in his Rede lecture he offered proofs that ‘the grey matter of the cerebral 
hemispheres is the exclusive seat of mind’ (Romanes, 1885: 77). But he disagreed with Clifford 
when it came to the scope of ejective thought being limited only to individual natural forms. 
‘Because within the limits of human experience mind is only known as associated with brain, it 
clearly does not follow that mind cannot exist in any other mode’ (Romanes 1885: 92). Building 
on Clifford’s ‘kindred consciousness,’ he pointed to society – the ‘social organism’ – that 
‘although composed of innumerable individual personalities, is, with regard to each of its 
constituent units, a part of the objective world – just as the human brain would be, were each 
of its constituent cells of a construction sufficiently complex to yield a separate personality’ 
(Romanes, 1886: 51-52). And it was possible to discern in this social organism some form of 
subjectivity: 
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‘Seeing that ideas are often, as it is said, “in the air” before they are condensed in the mind 
of individual genius, we habitually speak of the “Zeitgeist” as a kind of collective 
psychology, which is something other than the mere sum of all the individual minds of a 
generation. That is to say, we regard Society as an eject … . The ejective existence thus 
ascribed to Society serves as a stepping-stone to the yet more vague and general ascription 
of such existence to the Cosmos.’ 
The world as eject 
Romanes proposed that the subjective individual can extrapolate ejectively from other 
individuals he/she knows, to the collective of individuals we deem as a society and, ultimately, 
to the inanimate world around us – universal mind. Yet, according to Romanes in his paper – 
‘The world as an eject’ – Clifford would exclude the possibility of such a cosmic eject ‘unless we 
can show in the disposition of the heavenly bodies some morphological resemblance to the 
structure of the human brain.’ Romanes (1886: 49-50) thought otherwise: 
‘For aught that we can know to the contrary, not merely the highly specialized structure 
of the human brain, but even that of nervous matter in general, may only be one of a 
thousand possible ways in which the material and dynamic conditions required for the 
apparition of self-consciousness can be secured. To imagine that the human brain of 
necessity exhausts these possibilities is in the last degree absurd. … To take the particular 
conditions under which alone subjectivity is known to occur upon a single planet as 
exhausting the possibilities of its occurrence elsewhere, is too flagrant a use of the 
method of simple enumeration to admit of a moment’s countenance. … Therefore, … the 
one exhibition of subjectivity furnished to human experience, is the proof thus furnished 
that subjectivity is possible under some conditions. … The macrocosm does furnish amply 
sufficient opportunity … for the presence of subjectivity, even if it be assumed that 
subjectivity can only be yielded by an order of complexity analogous to that of a nervous 
system.’ 
What form might this cosmic subjectivity take? In the scheme of things, it is likely that you 
regard your mind as at a high level – much higher than, say, a stone, or even your arm muscle. 
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If there is something higher than your mind, it is an abstraction that you can imagine, if at all, 
only by extrapolation from mind. Considering ‘that the world … is at least as susceptible of an 
ejective as it is of a objective interpretation’ (Romanes, 1886: 59), then Romanes supposed 
that, ‘just as a mathematician is able to deal symbolically with space in n dimensions, while only 
able to conceive of space as limited to three dimensions, so I feel that I ought not to limit the 
abstract possibilities of mental being by what I may term the accidental conditions of my own 
being’ (Romanes, 1886: 54). Indeed, borrowing words from the theological domain,1 concerning 
his ‘world eject’ Romanes (1885: 92) held: 
‘There is a mode of mind which is not restricted to brain, but co-extensive with motion, is 
con-substantial and co-eternal with all that was, and is, and is to come; have we not at 
least a suggestion, that high as the heavens are above the earth, so high above our 
thoughts may be the thoughts of such a mind as this?’ 
2. Information 
Information flows from medium to medium 
Like most of their Victorian contemporaries, Clifford and Romanes never quite connected mind 
or body to the abstract concept of ‘information.’ While not using this word, Clifford (1878: 279-
280) recognized that different media could convey the same information. A given item of 
information could exist in more than one medium:  
‘A spoken sentence and the same sentence written, are two utterly unlike things, but 
each of them consists of elements; the spoken sentence of the elementary sounds of the 
language, the written sentence of its alphabet. … Or as we should say in mathematics, a 
sentence spoken is the same function of the elementary sounds as the same sentence 
written is of the corresponding letters.’ 
And, rather than mental ‘information for,’ he wrote of a mental ‘representation of,’ an external 
object – a candlestick (Clifford, 1878: 285): 
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‘The cerebral image is an imperfect representation of the candlestick, corresponding to it 
point for point in a certain way. Both the candlestick and the cerebral image are matter; 
but one material complex represents the other material complex in an imperfect way.’ 
Concerning mind, Romanes (1886: 57) instead of ‘information’ used abstractions such as 
‘inward meaning,’ ‘spiritual grace,’ and a reality that is ‘psychic’: 
‘Already we are able to perceive the immense significance of being able to regard any 
sequence of natural causation as … the merely outward manifestation of an inward 
meaning. Thus, for example, I am listening to a sonata of Beethoven’s played by Madame 
Schumann. … The great reality is the mind of Beethoven communicating to my mind 
through the complex intervention of three different brains with their neuromuscular 
systems, and an endless variety of aërial vibrations proceeding from the pianoforte. The 
method of communication has nothing more to do with the reality communicated than 
have the paper and ink of this essay to do with the ideas which they serve to convey. In 
each case a vehicle of symbols [medium] is necessary in order that one mind should 
communicate with another; but in both cases this is a vehicle of symbols, and nothing 
more. Everywhere, therefore, the reality may be psychical, and the physical symbolic; 
everywhere matter in motion may be the outward and visible sign of an inward and 
spiritual grace.’ 
And concerning bodies, when pondering the relationship between ‘germ-plasm’ contained in 
the egg and the resulting organism, Romanes (1893) again used Clifford’s ‘representation:’ 
‘The theory … supposes merely that every part of the future organism is represented in 
the egg-cell by corresponding material particles. And this, as far as I can understand, is 
exactly what the [Weismann] theory of germ-plasm supposes; only it calls the particles 
“molecules,” and seemingly attaches more importance to … variations in their 
arrangement or “constitution,” whatever these vague expressions may be intended to 
signify.’ 
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However, prior to this work, two others – the Prague neurophysiologist Ewald Hering (1834-
1918) and the ex-sheep-farmer, artist, and satirist, Samuel Butler (1835-1902) – had already 
begun to address in informational terms, the evolution of minds and bodies in the universe 
(Schacter, 2001: 106-119; Forsdyke: 2006; 2009; 2011a: 7-26). Fundamental to this was the idea 
that items of information, abstract in themselves, could not exist without media that would 
preserve and transmit them. Nevertheless, the ‘medium is the message’ (McLuhan, 1964: 23-
35) is only true when ‘message’ refers to the preserving/transporting agency, but not when it 
refers to the abstract item of information contained within that agency. This distinction was 
later emphasized by the influential American biologist George Williams (1926-2010): 
‘Information can exist only as a material pattern, but the same information can be recorded in a 
variety of patterns in many different kinds of material. A message is always coded in some 
medium, but the medium really is not the message’ (Williams, 1992: 10-13).  
Thoughts as information-flows 
Your mind manifests itself to you as information-flows that you call ‘thoughts.’ In writing the 
previous sentence, I converted a thought-information-flow into a textual-information-flow that 
you can read and then, hopefully, understand (generate further meaningful thought-
information-flows). ‘If I could think to you without words, you would understand me better’ 
lamented a friend of Samuel Butler, probably Charles Paine Pauli (Butler, 1878: 84).  Instead, 
Pauli had to convert his thought-information-flow into a textual-information-flow or speech-
information-flow. Then Butler, having received this form of information, had, in turn, to convert 
it back into a thought-information-flow. In an 1887 lecture he observed (Butler 1923: 190): 
‘The thought is not in the alphabet, nor in the words into which the letters of the alphabet 
are grouped. These are vehicles of thought, and in so far as they are this, they have made 
thought more easy, more convenient, more tidy, and have infinitely extended it; but they 
are not thought. Thought, and the appliances for facilitating and extending thought, grow 
up together as supply and demand invariably do; supply stimulates demand, and demand 
stimulates supply; but neither is the other. So thought stimulates language, and language, 
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thought; feeling stimulates the nervous system, and the nervous system, feeling; but the 
thought lies deeper than speech, and feeling, than the nervous system.’ 
Thought language preceded spoken language 
The word ‘language,’ as pointed out by Butler in an essay dated 1890 and 1894 (Butler, 1904: 
181), derives from the Latin word for tongue. This tends to make ‘language’ synonymous with 
‘spoken language,’ rather than generically referring to any form of coded information transfer – 
a transfer from medium to medium according to some convention (code). Yet, guided by our 
modern understanding of protein synthesis (see later), it follows that thought-information-flow 
must have a language (or languages) of its own, that we could refer to as ‘mentalese’ (Pinker, 
1994: 78-81). Thus, information flowed from Pauli to Butler when Pauli’s mentalese was 
converted into spoken words, and these words, in turn, were then converted into Butler’s 
mentalese. In his 1887 lecture Butler (1923: 200, 202) observed:  
‘As the word has only an artificial connection with the idea for which it passes current, so 
the idea itself has nothing but an arbitrary artificial and conventional connection with the 
object which it serves to bring before the mind. … Why do Englishmen and Frenchmen 
attach the same ideas to many external objects but not to all, and why do they differ so 
much more widely in language than in ideas? The reason is because ideas are far earlier 
things, and are, in fact, an infinitely older language, than the words which now do duty for 
them. The lower animals have no articulated language, but few will say that they have no 
ideas. A cat, for example, has very sufficient and definite ideas of a mouse or of milk. … 
Ideas, then, are much older than even the oldest and least specialized means of 
formulating and conveying them; and it is because they are so much older that they are 
so much more settled and differ so infinitely less in different nations. … It is only because 
language is so much newer than either ideas or feelings, that we are able with 
comparative ease to disinter its past and forecast its future; and if it were as old, it would 
be as mysterious as feeling is.’ 
As with other languages, mentalese should have syntactic structure. If mentalese evolved 
before spoken languages, then this pre-existing mentalese could have influenced the evolution 
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of those languages, which hence might share common syntactical features. This viewpoint 
would appear to differ from Chomsky (1965), who holds that constraints underlying a ‘universal 
grammar’ arose somatically from ‘physical or developmental limitations’ that had ‘little or 
nothing to do with communication’ per se. In other words, language is an exploitation, an 
‘exaptation,’ of something that pre-existed and served some other, essentially non-
communicative, role in brain function (Fitch, 2013).  
Perceptual distinctions are arbitrary  
Clifford (1878: 285-286) distinguished the cerebral image of an object from the ultimate mental 
image of that object, but held that both were contained in ‘mind-stuff.’ While the distinction 
intrigued Francis Crick in his ‘scientific search for the soul’ (1995: 255-263), it is not of primary 
concern here. But we can note that, once information in a cerebral image has been assimilated 
as a thought, by definition, it has become a mental image. For example, the redness of 
something may be conveyed in cerebral image mentalese. The evolutionary ‘decision’ that the 
mentalese conveying information on this particular wavelength of light, would be perceived as 
‘red’ – i.e. its qualia is red – may be no different from the decision Darwin’s parents made that 
the gurgling infant from whom information flowed to their senses, would be perceived as 
‘Charles.’ He had to be called something. He had to be distinguished by some name. Likewise, if 
it were evolutionarily advantageous to distinguish colours, each wavelength would have been 
‘assigned’ by natural selection an appropriate perceptual ‘name’ (colour). And if there were no 
advantage in associating a particular colour with a particular wavelength, then the assignment 
would have been random. But even if arbitrary, there had to be an assignment. The wavelength 
had to be ‘called’ something. The mechanistic basis by which ‘mind-stuff’ achieves this still 
eludes us. In 1887 the arbitrariness of the assignment of a feeling as ‘pain’ was noted by Butler 
(1923: 198-199): 
‘The feeling of which we are aware on being pricked by a pin has no primordial inherent 
inevitable connection with our being pricked, either by a pin or by anything else, but it is an 
arbitrary convention, invented and adopted for the purpose of enabling us more certainly 
and easily to recognize the combination of things and circumstances with which we have 
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associated it, in exactly the same way as the word stone is a conventional arrangement of 
certain sounds, … by means of which the idea of  a stone is more rapidly and certainly 
conveyed, though the word has no essential inherent connection with, nor resemblance to, 
a stone itself.’ 
3. The controversial role of Samuel Butler 
Genes and instincts as information 
Erwin Schrödinger's What is Life? (1944) inspired those who gave us DNA structure and 
associated informational concepts in the ‘classical period’ of molecular biology (1945-1966; 
Chargaff, 1978: 85; Olby, 2009: 65-66; Forsdyke, 2011a: 18; Cobb, 2013; Battail, 2014: 148-151). 
Indeed, in Mind and Matter he touched on many of the issues raised here (Schrödinger, 1958). 
But where did this famous physicist (born 1887 in Vienna) get these ideas? Although there were 
various mid-twentieth century influences (Sloan and Fogel, 2011: 1-35), in essays dated 1925 
and 1960 – published as My View of the World – Schrödinger (1964) repeatedly cited the 
Mneme books of Richard Semon, who had studied with Haeckel in Jena. English translations 
appeared in the 1920s (Schacter, 2001). We can now trace the path of fundamental 
informational ideas – oscillating between German and English – from Hering/Butler to Semon 
(1904), to Schrödinger, and then on to Francis Crick and others. 
From the outset Butler saw the inheritance of parental characters by offspring in 
informational terms and the word ‘information’ was used in appropriate context (Butler 1880: 
252): 
‘Does the offspring act as if it remembered? The answer to this question is not only 
that it does so act, but that it is not possible to account for either its development or 
its early instinctive actions upon any other hypothesis that that of its remembering, 
and remembering exceedingly well. The only alternative is to declare … that a living 
being may display a vast and varied information concerning all manner of details, and 
be able to perform most intricate operations, independently of experience and 
13 
 
practice.’ [My italics] 
 Traces of this view are in his satirical Erewhon (Butler, 1872). When Darwin’s son Francis 
told Butler that Hering (1870) had been thinking similarly (Forsdyke, 2006), Butler set about 
learning German, and a translation of Hering was in the third of his major works on evolution – 
Unconscious Memory (Butler, 1880). Butler held that the information passed from generation 
to generation, be it related to bodily function, or to brain function (instincts), was a ‘hereditary 
memory.’ He used ‘memory,’ not as a process of recall (e.g. ‘she’s got a good memory’), but as 
stored information – a usage familiar today as computer memory. Butler’s view was opposed by 
Romanes, who pointed out that Charles Kingsley (1867) had described bird migration likewise:  
‘Yon woodwren … essayed the British Channel, and was blown back, … [yet] he felt, 
nevertheless, that “that was water he must cross,” he knew not why: but something told 
him that his mother had done it before him, and he was flesh of her flesh, life of her life, 
and had inherited her “instinct” (as we call hereditary memory, in order to avoid the 
trouble of finding out what it is, and how it comes).’ 
Yet, in Evolution, Old and New, Butler (1879: 315-324) had already noted an ascription (1831) 
by Patrick Matthew, the Scottish landowner acknowledged by Darwin as having proposed 
evolution by natural selection decades earlier than himself (Schacter, 2001: 115): 
‘The continuation of family type [heredity], … is mental as well as corporeal, and is 
exemplified in many of the dispositions or instincts of particular races of men. These 
innate or continuous ideas or habits seem proportionally greater in the insect tribes, and 
in those especially of shorter revolution [lifespan]; and forming an abiding memory, may 
resolve much of the enigma of instinct, and the foreknowledge which these tribes have of 
what is necessary to completing their round of life, reducing this to knowledge or 
impressions and habits acquired by a long experience.’  
In his 1838 Notebook M Charles Darwin wrote likewise: ‘Now if memory of a tune and words 
can thus lie dormant, during a whole life time, quite unconsciously of it, surely memory from 
one generation to another, also without consciousness, as instincts are, is not so very 
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wonderful’ (Barrett et al., 1987: 521). In modern terminology, our minds do not begin as ‘blank 
slates.’ Some specific ‘softwares’ come ‘factory-installed.’ Butler was defended (anonymously) 
by Cambridge philosopher James Ward (1884), who accused  Romanes of improperly attacking, 
while at the same time silently adopting, Butler’s arguments (Pauly, 1982).  
Hering’s essay approved by Bateson’s mentor 
Although Hering’s work was mentioned in a Nature review of an essay by Haeckel (Lankester, 
1876), it seemed to have little impact. Writing to Romanes in 1876, Darwin thought the essay 
‘clever and striking’ and noted the ‘stress on inheritance being a form of unconscious memory,’ 
but was otherwise dismissive (Schwartz, 2010: 138-151). However, a Johns Hopkins University 
professor, William K. Brooks (1848-1908), quoted Haeckel extensively. There was ‘a profound 
truth’ in the view of Hering that ‘Heredity is Memory,’ (Brooks, 1883: 33-41):  
‘It is plain that this power [to adjust to the environment] depends upon experience, but 
experience depends upon “memory.” So we may state, with truth, that in a certain sense, 
life is memory. … We know memory, however, only in connection with organization, and 
if it is true that heredity, the power of an organism to reproduce its like, is simply the 
memory, by the ovum, of the experience of its ancestors, we must believe that there 
exists in the ovum an organization of some kind to correspond to each of these past 
experiences.’ 
In 1883 and 1884 Brooks was visited by a young Cambridge zoologist, William Bateson 
(1861-1926), who in 1886 would be much impressed by a paper of Romanes on the origin of 
species (Cock and Forsdyke, 2008: 131-132). In 1900 Bateson would also be much impressed by 
an earlier paper of Gregor Mendel that he brought to the attention of the English-speaking 
world (Cock and Forsdyke, 2008: 198-220). Echoing Brooks, Bateson refered to genetic factors, 
not as conveying ‘information for,’ but as possessing ‘the power to produce,’ parental 
characters in their children (Cock and Forsdyke, 2008: 325). And, echoing Romanes (1893), in an 
address in 1914 (Cock and Forsdyke, 2008: 410-411) he supposed that: 
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‘The elements upon which … [parental characters] depend … [are not] in any simple or 
literal sense material particles. I suspect rather that their properties depend on some 
phenomenon of arrangement. … By the re-arrangement of a very moderate number of 
things we soon reach a number of possibilities practically infinite.’ 
Richard Semon 
The Hering/Butler viewpoint, and Butler’s extensive elaborations thereof, were adopted in 
Germany by Richard Semon (1859-1918), who coined a complex new terminology.  But Semon 
considered Butler’s work ‘rather a retrogression than an advance’ (Schacter, 2001: 122). 
Indeed, Francis Darwin praised Semon, while according Butler perfunctory acknowledgment 
(Cock and Forsdyke, 2008: 544). At the Darwin Centenary celebration, Bateson (1909) praised 
Butler, but concerning the ‘Mneme-theory of Semon,’ the latter’s mentor, Haeckel (1909), was 
ecstatic:  
‘The most important advance that evolution has made since Darwin and the most 
valuable amplification of his theory of selection is … the work of Richard Semon … . He 
offers a psychological explanation of the facts of heredity by reducing them to a process 
of (unconscious) memory. The physiologist Ewald Hering had shown in 1870 that memory 
[stored information] must be regarded as a general function of organic matter, and that 
we are quite unable to explain … reproduction and inheritance, unless we admit this 
unconscious memory.’ 
Others, no less ecstatically, later recalled the appearance of Die Mneme as ‘a comet, glowing 
and trailing a long tail’ (Goldschmidt, 1956). Writing in German in 1925, Schrödinger ranked 
Semon with Spinoza and Schopenhauer, as one with whose writings he had been ‘deeply 
involved’ in his youth (Schrödinger, 1964: viii). However, by this time Butler’s work had won 
some recognition in the English-speaking world and Semon was accused of improperly 
attacking, while at the same time silently adopting, Butler’s arguments (Cock and Forsdyke, 
2008: 549-553).  
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Sigmund Freud’s writings on the unconscious mind were then gaining attention, but he 
acknowledged a debt neither to Butler (Parkin-Gounelas, 2007), nor to Semon. In 1884 Hering 
had invited the young Freud to become his assistant (Freud 1984: 211-212). In a book – The 
Unconscious - An Introduction to Freudian Psychology – philosopher Israel Levine (1923: 39-42) 
portrayed Butler as representative of ‘Pre-Freudian views of the Unconscious,’ linking him to 
Leibniz (1646-1716). However, in Anna Freud’s translation into German of Levine’s book, Freud 
himself chose to translate the Butler section, adding a footnote: ‘German readers, familiar with 
this lecture of Hering's and regarding it as a masterpiece, would not, of course, be inclined to 
bring into the foreground the considerations based on it by Butler.’ At a 1906 meeting of the 
Viennese Psychoanalytic Society, Freud had been critical of Semon’s Die Mneme (Otis. 1994: 
187-188): 
‘[I] learned from Semon’s book only that the Greek word for memory is mneme. The book 
is characteristic of those pseudo scientists who imitate exactitude merely by operating 
with numbers and concepts, and then feel they have accomplished something. Hering’s 
idea, which is Semon’s point of departure, is ingenious and subtle, but only the opposite 
can be said of Semon’s work. Only he who has new things to say is entitled to coin new 
terms.’ 
But, while Butler lies buried as ‘a classical crank,’ Semon lives on (Schacter, 2001: 196)! 
Happily, the Clifford/Romanes version of ToM, as developed by James Baldwin (1861-1934) and 
Jean Piaget (1896-1980), also lives on (Obiols and Berrios, 2009; Frith, 2012), but seldom in the 
informational sense dealt with here and elsewhere (Tononi and Koch, 2014).2 
4. Modern perspectives 
Hereditary-information-flow   
For present purposes our understanding, in exquisite molecular detail, how Clifford’s ‘matter in 
motion’ corresponds to the transfer of information through the generations, is largely 
irrelevant. But it does help us clarify the notion of information as an abstraction. At face value, 
a DNA sequence appears as a random sequence of its four base ‘symbols’ or  ‘letters,’ – A, C, G 
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and T. For example: TTCAGCCTCGTGGGGGACAAG. This sequence can be nothing more than 
what you see. So the molecule is but a vehicle for the bases of which it is composed. But it also, 
by virtue of the particular order and type of its base letters, contains information, just as the 
sentence you are now reading contains information. This abstract entity – the ‘message’ within 
a sequence – is extracted from the DNA by the cellular transcribing apparatus which assembles 
a corresponding RNA sequence without destroying the originating DNA (i.e. the latter’s 
information is copied). The information within the resulting ‘messenger RNA’ is then extracted 
by the cellular decoding apparatus, which uses it to assemble a sequence of amino acid ‘letters’ 
– say FSPVGDK. Here the first ‘letter’ is F, but it could have been any one of the other nineteen 
amino acids. This is a part of a protein, and is encoded by the above DNA sequence and its 
messenger RNA copy. Thus, information flows from medium to medium, and if the flow is 
faithful, we can say that each medium has accurately received, preserved, and transmitted, it. 
A protein folds into a structure determined by the order and type of its amino acid letters. It 
can then play some specific role. It may ‘tell’ a cell to accelerate a certain chemical process, or 
to build more membrane. Thus, in less discrete (analog) form, the information in the original 
message flows onward (Noll, 2003). While the details need not detain us, we can clearly 
recognize the initial flow of digital coded information from DNA to RNA and to protein, with 
each step of this flow being entirely dependent on the chemistry of, and energy provided by, 
the cell. There is no step wherein the information is free of a medium. But the information itself 
is an abstraction. The information is not the medium, but it is medium-based. In terminology 
that antedates modern biochemistry (Clifford, 1878: 278), the ‘motion of matter’ brings 
hereditary information to serve our practical, day-to-day, needs. 
Permanency and independence of ‘selfish’ information 
Apart from this, hereditary information is preserved and passed through the generations. The 
medium – parental DNA – is replicated to produce DNA-bearing gametes. Here information 
flows from one DNA molecule to a structurally identical DNA molecule. The parents with the 
DNA they contain may then perish. Each new generation is defined by the information that is 
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passed to it. Segments of DNA encoding information for cat characters, confer catness on 
offspring.  
Such segments, of which the best understood are the genes, can be seen as independent 
entities. The essence of a gene is its information – its informational message – not the transient 
medium that contains it. This immortality of genes, which are preserved and transported by the 
mortal organisms that host them, was noted by Wilhelm Johanssen in 1923 (Cock and Forsdyke, 
2008: 504-507), and by Hans Kalmus (1950), who remarked: 
‘A gene … is a message, which can survive the death of the individual and can thus be 
received repeatedly by several organisms of different [successive] generations. A gene 
may reproduce itself faithfully and in fact we do not know of any gene which can survive 
without doing so. … The permanency of [brain] memory as popularly understood has 
often been stressed –  “the elephant never forgets” – but it is certainly surpassed by the 
permanency of the genes, which carry their messages through the generations.’ 
Here, of course, it is the medium – DNA – that ‘may reproduce itself faithfully,’ but the 
abstract informational message it contains does not just come along for the ride. The presence 
of the proper informational message ensures that DNA reproduction will be sustained. Genic 
messages endowing offspring with more advantageous characters will ensure, not only the 
survival of their hosts, but also their own survival, and thus, the future replication of the media 
that happen to contain them (Forsdyke, 2011b).  
Macrocosmic information 
Kalmus’s theme was taken up by Williams (1966: 22-25) and, more popularly, by Richard 
Dawkins (1976: 205-206),3 who considered such ‘selfish’ genes as examples of universal 
‘replicators’ that, along the lines of Romanes (1886: 49-50), could serve as models for 
macrocosmic forms of information:  
‘What … is so special about genes? The answer is that they are replicators. The laws of 
physics are supposed to be true all over the accessible universe. Are there any principles 
of biology which are likely to have similar universal validity? When astronauts voyage to 
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distant planets and look for life, they can expect to find creatures too strange and 
unearthly for us to imagine. But is there anything which must be true of all life, wherever 
it is found, and whatever the basis of its chemistry? If forms of life exist whose chemistry 
is based on silicon rather than carbon, or ammonia rather than water, if creatures are 
discovered which boil to death at -100 degrees centigrade, if a form of life is found which 
is not based on chemistry at all, but on electronic reverberating circuits, will there still be 
any general principle which is true of all life? … I would put my money on one 
fundamental principle. This is the law that all life evolves by the differential survival of 
replicating entities. The gene … happens to be the replicating entity which prevails on our 
own planet.’ 
Thus, matter in motion would have varied until it happened to acquire both the ability to self-
replicate, and the stability to sustain a chain-reaction, so allowing production of more of its 
kind. There was random variation in the material world until a form arose that ‘made sense’ 
informationally, such that differential survival was possible. The material world would have 
preceded the informational world. Natural selection’s culling of these randomly generated 
different informational forms would have followed.  
The limits of DNA 
Darwin came close to modern gene concepts when postulating fundamental units named 
‘gemmules’ (Forsdyke 2001: 151), and Butler (1878: 187) supposed ‘a memory to “run” each 
gemmule.’ In 1923 the words ‘memory’ and ‘hereditary continuity’ entered Johannsen’s 
discussion of genes (Cock and Forsdyke, 2008: 504-507), but ‘memory’ (i.e. stored information) 
did not acquired regular usage in this context until the ‘information revolution’ of the 1940s 
(Kalmus, 1950; Noll, 2003). However, the cybernetics pioneer Norbert Wiener (1950: 102, 182) 
went no further than noting: 
‘The biological individuality of an organism seems to lie in a certain continuity of process, 
and in the memory by the organism of the effects of its past development. This appears to 
hold also of its mental development. In terms of the computing machine, the individuality 
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of mind lies in the retention of earlier tapings and memories, and in its continued 
development along lines already laid out.’ 
We now know that a DNA sequence can simultaneously contain many, sometimes 
overlapping, informational messages. These can convey both genic and non-genic information 
that, given limited channel capacity, must compete with each other for genome space (Shadrin 
and Parkhomchuk, 2014; Battail, 2014). So far, there is no evidence that DNA can sustain the 
transfer of instinctual information between generations (Forsdyke, 2011a: 3-26). Thus the 
informational bases of nervous systems (mental memory) and genomes (genetic memory) 
differ (Forsdyke, 2006, 2009). 
The mental realm 
Romanes and Butler were sons of clergymen and went to Cambridge with the intention of 
taking holy orders. Romanes switched to the biological sciences at an early stage. Butler 
completed the Classical Tripos and worked in a London parish in 1858 to prepare for ordination. 
However, increasingly doubting earlier religious teachings – such as are described in The Fair 
Haven (Butler, 1873a) and The Way of All Flesh (Butler, 1903) – he switched to practical biology, 
reading Darwin’s Origin of Species and Justus Liebig’s Agricultural Chemistry while profitably 
sheep farming in New Zealand (Forsdyke, 2006).   
Confronted by dual variables – matter/motion and mind – Romanes pondered whether mind 
(‘Spiritualism’) was ‘the ultimate Reality’ that anteceded matter and motion (‘Materialism’), or 
vice versa. He concluded by equating them (Romanes, 1886). This non-dualist ‘theory of 
Monism’ is described in his Mind, Motion and Monism. Thus, ‘mental phenomena and physical 
phenomena, although apparently diverse, are really identical’ (Romanes, 1895: 83). Yet, his 
other poetic, philosophical and religious works (Romanes, 1889, 1895; Turner, 1974: 134-163; 
Pleins, 2014) suggest that monism did not satisfy his deep theological doubts.  
A century later, Williams (1992: 3-4) also had doubts. He advised ‘an open mind … especially 
for neural phenomena. … I have no inclination to deny the mental realm or belittle its 
philosophical importance. I am inclined merely to delete it from biological explanation.’ Thus, 
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he declared himself not an atheist, but preferred to define atheism out of existence (Williams, 
1997: 152-153): ‘Whatever entity or complex of entities is responsible for the universe being as 
we find it, rather than some other way or not there at all, can be called God.’  
Romanes (1882: 881-882) had distinguished two processes, those ‘taking place in a 
something which is without extension or physical properties of any kind, and the other taking 
place in a something which … we recognize as having extension and other antithetical 
properties which we together class as physical.’ Likewise, Williams (1997: 164-166) categorized 
three distinct ‘domains’ for processes: the material, the informational (‘codical’), and the 
mental. A segment of DNA was in the material domain. The abstract potentially immortal gene 
that it might convey was in the informational domain. The mental domain was, somehow, 
separate from these.  
As example, Williams gave the word ‘guilt’ that either ‘can be a feeling (mental) about 
oneself or a public judgment (codical), perhaps as a result of a jury trial.’ However, mental guilt 
can be seen as a mentalese-information-flow within the accused that may, or may not, be 
externalized in speech or text. Likewise, judicial guilt can be seen as mentalese-information-
flow within a judge – an opinion (thought) that becomes action when it is externalized as a 
spoken or textual verdict. It seems unnecessary to disassociate informational and mental 
domains merely because one information-flow tends to remain internalized as a ‘feeling,’ 
whereas the other is converted into action. This was essentially the point made by Butler in his 
colourful 1887 lecture ‘On the genesis of feeling’ (Butler, 1923: 193): ‘But reflection will show 
that opinion and feeling row in the same boat, and that as we form opinion so also we form the 
feeling on which the opinion is based and from which it springs – feeling being only opinion writ 
small.’ He held that a ‘grammar of feeling’ had evolved early, in much the same way that a 
grammar of language had evolved (Butler, 1923: 205-206): 
‘Even our most well defined and hereditary instinctive feelings were in the outset formed … 
by long and arduous development of an originally conventional arrangement of sensation 
and perception – symbols – caught hold of in the first instance as the only things we could 
grasp, and applied with as little rhyme or reason as children learning to speak apply the 
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strange and uncouth sounds which are all they can then utter. … When I say “we,” I mean, 
of course, our remote invertebrate ancestors, … [who] attached some of the few and vague 
sensations, which were all they could then command, to such motions of outside things as 
echoed within themselves, and used them to feel; hence, presently, by repetition of the 
same process, they invented a second conventional arrangement of ideas – symbols – to 
think the things with which they connected them, so as to docket them and recognize them 
with greater force, certainty, and clearness; much as we use words to help us docket and 
grasp our ideas and feelings, or written characters to help us docket and grasp our words. 
Having once established the connection they stuck to it, not probably without much 
wrangling … , nor yet without the growing up of many different languages, as it were, of 
feeling, some of which doubtless still prevail among the … lower existing forms of life. … On 
this, the development of a rude grammar of feeling, and of the nervous mechanism 
whereby its rules could be alone formulated and carried into practice, were a mere 
question of time … .’ 
By virtue of his firm grasp of the information concept, Butler was better able to cast aside 
religious trappings to arrive at an essentially similar viewpoint as Romanes, while avoiding 
much of his theological angst (Forsdyke, 2006, 2009, 2011a: 7-26). In Unconscious Memory, 
Butler quoted Hering with approval (Butler, 1880: 102-103): 
‘The materialist regards consciousness [mind, spirit] as a product or result of matter, 
while the idealist holds matter to be a result of consciousness, and a third maintains that 
matter and spirit are identical; with all this the physiologist, as such, has nothing 
whatsoever to do; his sole concern is with the fact that matter and consciousness are 
functions one of the other.’ [Thus, mind and matter are] ‘two variables … so dependent 
upon one another in the changes they undergo in accordance with fixed laws that a 
change in either involves simultaneous and corresponding changes in the other.’  
Failure to communicate 
However, as with many others who came to study Butler’s writings, the historian Frank Turner 
(1974: 164-200) did not see memory in informational terms. Despite Butler’s satirical style that 
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many recognized, Turner took literally Butler’s self-proclaimed amateur status. Butler’s 
‘patchwork’ writings were considered to lack ‘philosophical rigor,’ and some, such as The Fair 
Haven, were declared ‘a total failure.’ Turner concluded that ‘there was nothing in Butler’s 
writings to suggest that he believed the presence behind reality itself had any essence … .’ To 
Turner, this non-material lack of essence meant a ‘spiritual,’ not ‘informational,’ abstraction.  
If Butler failed in any way, it is perhaps that his fair-minded personal ToM led him to look 
horizontally across to, rather than down on, those who might be his peers. In short, he did not 
realize just how far ahead his own thinking was. The truculence he so often encountered was 
seen as willful, rather than as an expression of bewilderment. When The Fair Haven was 
attacked, Butler (1873b) responded: ‘The main purpose of the book was not argumentative, but 
satirical. … A writer cannot write for everyone; he must assume a certain amount of 
apprehensiveness on the part of his readers and is justified in leaving children and stupid 
people out of his calculations.’  
Outsourcing long term memory 
Romanes had gone beyond Clifford in proposing that extracorporeal mindstuff could become 
organized, but in 1886 he did not consider how this proposed ‘world eject,’ perhaps with its 
own subjectivity, might relate to the apparently localized subjectivity of an individual brain. 
Conflicting with the view that ‘the phenomena of mind are invariable in their association with 
cerebral structures’ (Romanes, 1882: 880), the brain as ‘the exclusive seat of mind’ is today 
challenged by considerations of the massive storage space needed both by human brains for 
long-term memory, and by gametes for the transfer of instinctual information into the long-
term memory of the embryos they generate (Forsdyke, 2009). Indeed, recent reports hint that 
such information might be stored in, and retrieved from, an extracorporeal source, by a process 
analogous to ‘cloud computing.’ This source could correspond, in part, to Romanes’ world eject. 
Evidence that part of our minds might not be cranially localized, challenges no less a 
philosopher than Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969: 18e) who, in On Certainty, pondered: ‘Now would 
it be correct to say: So far no one has opened my skull in order to see whether there is a brain 
inside; but everything speaks for, and nothing against, its being what they would find there?’ 
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Extreme examples of extracorporeal localization could be rare individuals whose childhood 
hydrocephaly was thought to have been successfully treated and are functionally normal – one 
even obtaining a first class degree in mathematics. Yet they are found to have only 5% the 
normal volume of cerebral tissue (Lewin, 1980). While initially disbelieved, there are now two 
further reports of relatively normal individuals with such minute brain tissue volumes. While, as 
noted by Makorek (2012) and Forsdyke (2014, 2015), these cases stretch the credibility of brain 
‘plasticity’ explanations (the 5% able to become functionally close to 100%), or ‘redundancy’ 
explanations (we normally use 5% and the remaining 95% is superfluous), many neuroscientists 
still disbelieve. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and neurones are known 
to be remarkably stress-resistant (Ding et al., 2001). But there are growing indications that the 
hallowed foundations of modern neuroscience are not as stable as once supposed (Firestein, 
2012; Satel and  Lilienfeld, 2013). 
And that complex ‘factory-installed’ behaviors (instincts) can be accounted for on the basis 
of the information content of gametes alone is also hard to believe. Outsourcing to a parallel 
extracorporeal racial memory – a ‘collective unconscious’ (Jung, 1959) – that could be tapped 
into during neural development, is no less hard to believe. Yet, failing the emergence of other 
explanations, both these arguments-from-incredulity deserve a place at the table of responsible 
neuroscientific discourse. While the critical ‘crossroads neuroscience has reached’ is gaining 
recognition, a multimillion dollar ‘brain initiative’ (Yuste and Church, 2014) may err if too 
narrowly focused on that wonderful organ.  
Conclusions  
Inspired by Darwin and well versed in the classic languages, mathematics, philosophy and 
theology, Victorians such as Clifford, Romanes, and Butler, seem to have been better able to 
think broadly on biological problems – see the big picture –  than many, detail-laden, later 
scientists and philosophers. The information concept entered biology with Hering and Butler, 
and passed by way of Semon and Schrödinger to illuminate the emergent discipline of 
molecular biology (1945-1966). Romanes was able to extrapolate Clifford’s ToM hypothesis 
from individual humans to their societies – a ‘stepping stone’ to mind in the universe. The 
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relationship, if any, of this higher order of subjectivity (‘world eject’) to that of individuals, was 
clouded by his persisting theological concerns. However, recent reports of normal memory, and 
even advanced intellect, in rare individuals with greatly reduced brain volume, would be 
consistent with an accessible extracorporeal long-term memory that might be part of such a 
higher subjectivity. Whether of external or internal origin, mentalese-information-flows 
(‘thoughts’) interact to generate the ‘meanings’ that, when we are awake, exist as information-
flows in our conscious and unconscious minds and, when we are asleep, exist as information-
flows in our unconscious minds (Majorek, 2012; Mashoura and Alkire, 2013). 
 
Acknowledgements 
Gérard Battail and Chris Frith provided constructive comments on the manuscript.  
 
Notes 
1. Religious texts have so shaped our language over millennia that we now use words, such as 
‘goodbye’ (presumably ‘God be with you’), with little thought for religious implications. 
Thus, it does not follow, since we borrow words from the domain deemed theological, that 
we necessarily subscribe to the beliefs of that domain. By the same token, just as 
politicians act prudently by being seen to practice religious faith, so daily prayers for family 
and servants was the norm in some Victorian households (Butler, 1903), where it would 
have been important to attract and retain dutiful servants, and to ‘properly’ educate 
children (Schwartz, 2010: 25-27).   
2. Aspects of this paper overlap with the ‘Integrated Information Theory’ (IIT) of Tononi and 
Koch (2014), who equate consciousness with subjectivity – a definition similar to that of 
Majorek (2012). However, the scope of this subjectivity is more limited than proposed 
here. There is no Zeitgeist. Thus Tononi and Koch ‘consider two people talking: within each 
brain, there will be a main complex – a set of neurons that form a maximally irreducible 
whole with definite borders … . Now let the two speak together. …  According to IIT, there 
should indeed be two separate experiences, but no superordinate conscious entity that is 
the union of the two.’ For present purposes, two people communicating is the same as two 
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parts of an individual brain communicating. In both cases, information flows can interact to 
give an output greater than the sum of the whole.  
3. While a putative path to the selfish gene idea is described here and elsewhere (Forsdyke, 
2011b), evidence for direct antecedent influences is unclear, with the exception of Williams 
who is cited by Dawkins. But ideas usually arrive first, just as ideas. The words ideas 
subsequently ‘fly with’ (Butler 1904: 187) can aid in their comprehension and marketing. 
Different words compete for this role. The words Johannsen, Kalmus, and Williams each 
assigned to the idea of the selfish gene, lost to the ‘selfish gene’ of Dawkins (1976). 
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